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RECENT CASE NOTES
congressional intent of the ordinary meaning, and be given a construction
which will be applicable uniformly throughout the country, irrespective of
the particular local meaning. As the court stated in refusing a tax deduction,
"It does not matter that in Ohio where the property lies, these long leases
are treated as in many respects like a conveyance of the fee. The Act
of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of local law."1 5 An example
of the court's refusal to accept the local classification of a business entity
was its upholding of corporate taxes upon businesses that the state classified
as partnerships.16 The necessity for interpretation of our tax laws in the
absence of language evidencing a different purpose so as to give an uniform
application to a nation-wide scheme of taxation was also brought out by the
Supreme Court in Burnet u. Harmel,17 limiting the application of state law
to the federal taxing acts when by express language or necessary implication
the act makes its own operation dependent upon state law. In the same
decision the court epitomized the law by stating, "The state law creates
!egal interests but the federal statutes determine when and how they shall
be taxed." Or stated otherwise, the state decisions fixing title and legal right
to property are controlling upon the Federal Courts,1 8 but state decisions as
to the character of devolution of a decedent's estate, or determining whether
property received is income or capital, are not controlling on the Federal
Courts in the administration of the Federal Revenue Laws.1 9
The considerations favoring uniformity of construction, in so far as
constitutionally possible are numerous and overpowering. The inherent in-
justice of permitting taxpayers in the same economic stratum to be affected
differently by the same federal statute is evident in itself. In the noted
case, the Supreme Court, realizing this need for uniformity, has rightfully
refused to consider the local law by interpreting the exemption of "inheritance"
in the Federal Income Tax to include property acquired by compromise of a
will contest, and thereby establishing a construction which will be applicable
uniformly throughout the country. I. K.
TORT LIABILrT WrTHouT PRIVITy-INSTALLATION OF IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS
INSTRUMENTALrrY.-The defendant negligently installed a furnace in the
plaintiff's dance hall under a contract with the tenant in possession. The
installation was completed and the work was accepted by the tenant. Some
time later when the first fire was built in the furnace the building caught
fire and considerable damage was sustained. For the negligent installation
the landlord sued the defendant who contended there was no liability without
privity. Held, the furnace was so negligently installed as to be imminently
dangerous to third persons and thus the defendant is liable for the damage
to the plaintiff's property. Nauracaj v. Holland Furnace Co. (Ind. 1938), 14
N. E. (2d) 339.
15 Weiss v. Wiener (1928), 279 U. S. 333, 337, 49 S. Ct. 337.
16Burk-Waggoner Oil Assoc. v. Hopkins (1925), 269 U. S. 110, 46
S. Ct. 48.
17 (1932), 287 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 74.
I8 See cases cited in note 11, supra.
19 See Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (1938) Ch. 1. Also
Barton, Effect of State Laws on Federal Tax Laws (1931), 10 Tax Mag. 11.
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Those rules of law concerning the liability of manufacturers or vendors
of chattels to persons not in privity of contract are analogous but not identical
with those concerning the liability of independent contractors constructing
or installing something on realty. Practically speaking, both rules originally
limited the liability of the vendor or the contractor to the party with whom
he contracted. Traditionally, a manufacturer or vendor of chattels was
not liable to anyone not in privity of contract for negligence, save in a few
exceptional situations. 1  Similarly where an independent contractor was
employed to construct or install any given work or instrumentality and had
completed the work and obtained a discharge from his employer, he was
not liable to third persons for injuries sustained as a result of defective
construction or installation.2 Patently, if this were still the law, the plaintiff
could not recover in this case. Both traditional rules, however, have been
greatly modified.
The first "assault upon the citadel of privity" 3 was made by the inherent
danger doctrine. Some things such as poisons and explosives are by their
very natures likely to cause serious harm if negligently manufactured, labeled,
or controlled, and liability upon manufacturers and vendors was first imposed
here without privity of contract.4 Gradually the courts extended this doctrine
to allow recovery despite lack of privity for the manufaciure or sale of
chattels not inherently dangerous but which became imminently dangerous
when negligently manufactured. 5 The final development of the encroach-
ment upon the privity rule was reached in the modern cases. In McPherson
v. Buick Auto Co. it was held that the duty of the manufacturer was the
same toward subsequent vendees, the ultimate user, or persons in the vicinity
of the chattel as toward the immediate vendee.6 Subsequent cases following
this holding state that the negligence of the intermediate vendee in failing
to inspect, although relieving the original vendor from liability toward the
one failing to inspect, would not relieve the vendor from liability toward
an innocent third person. 7 This development has destroyed for all practical
purposes the privity of contract rule in cases involving manufacturers.
Similarly, a breach in the rule discharging an independent contractor
upon acceptance by his contractee was made by the exception that where
an independent contractor turns over the thing constructed or installed in a
manner so negligent as to make it imminently dangerous to third persons he
1Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), 10 M. & W. 109; National Savings
Bank v. Ward (1880), 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621; Losee v. Clute (1873), 51
N. Y. 494, 10 Am. Rep. 138.
2 Curtain v. Somerset (1891), 140 Pa. St. 70, 23 Am. St. Rep. 220, 10 L. R.
A. 322; Wharton, Negligence, sec. 368; Moll, Independent Contractors, sec. 177.
3 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (1931), 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441.
4 Walton v. Booth (1882), 34 La. Ann. 913, 41 La. Rep. 606; Calahan v.
Waine (1867), 40 Mo. 131; Norton v. Sewal (1870), 106 Mass. 143, 8 Am. Dec.
455; Thomas v. Winchester (1852), 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455.
5 Jaroniic v. Hasselborth (1928), 223 App .Div. 182, 228 N. Y. S. 302;
Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co. (1903), 88 App. Div. 309, 84 N. Y. S.
622; Statler v. Roy Mfg. Co. (1909), 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E. 1064; Laudeman
v. Russel & Co (1910), 46 Ind. App. 32, 91 N. E. 822; Prince v. Bidwell
Thresher Co. (1909), 158 Mich. 356, 122 N. W. 628.
6 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
7 Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co. (1928), 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855.
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is still subject to liability to them despite his discharge by his employer. 8
The term "imminently dangerous" developed in both types of cases from
a few exceptions to a multitude, and thus became an important qualification
to both rules, and in the case of manufacturers actually destroyed the rule.
The cases in Indiana show a development in conformity. In Daugherty
v. Herzog, plaintiff was injured when a building fell two years after re-
modelling due to the negligence of the defendant in fastening the beams
and ironwork; however, the court held this building was not imminently
dangerous to third persons.9 More recently in Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart
the doctrine was greatly extended; it was held here that negligently shutting
off steam in one apartment so that the pipes froze and leaked water through
the floor damaging the goods of the tenant below was an act "imminently
dangerous" to third persons.1O Evidently this case and the present one
have so greatly extended the meaning of "imminently dangerous" as almost
to destroy the rule. While there are some dicta in both cases for basing
liability alone on negligence toward the injured party irrespective of con-
tractual relation, the courts as a whole have so far failed to extend the rule
to that point.
Judging from the present rule concerning privity of contract as relating
to negligence of manufacturers and the close similarity in the development
of the rule as relating to independent contractors, we may expect that in the
near future the courts will drop the distinction between things "imminently
dangerous" and things not "imminently dangerous." Constructing or installing
structures or equipment in such a manner as to constitute an unreasonable
danger to property interests or the safety of third persons will alone be
enough to subject the contractor to liability. The discharge rule would then
operate only as a discharge toward the employer himself and would not
discharge the duty of an independent contractor toward third persons.
W. E. B.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-RIGHT TO RECOVER COMPENSATION.-An
employee of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was killed under circum-
stances that gave rise to a claim against the railroad company. Plaintiff, a
retired railroad claim agent, undertook to negotiate a settlement with the rail-
road company upon the behalf of the widow and minor children pursuant to
an understanding that he was to be paid a reasonable sum for services ren-
dered. Through his negotiations a settlement was finally effected. On distribu-
tion of the amount received the widow as administratrix refused to pay the
plaintiff. In the lower court the plaintiff recovered for services rendered. On
appeal, reversed: the court holding that the settling of a claim constituted the
practice of law and that any unlicensed person engaged in the practice of
law cannot recover for services rendered. Fink u. Peden (Ind. 1938), 17 N.
E. (2d) 95.
8 Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N. E. 680;
Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co. (1928), 331o Ill. 78, 164 N. E. 162.
9 Daugherty v. Herzog (1896), 145 Ind. 255, 44 N. E. 457; Travix v. Roches-
ter Bridge Co. (1919), 188 Ind. 79, 122 N. E. 1.
1OPeru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N. E. 680;
Casey v. Hoover et al. (1905), 114 Mo. App. 47, 89 S. W. 330.
